Criminology

Q1. There are a number of advantages and disadvantages which can be achieved by vesting police and intelligence operations under one agency. Police officers are the legal law enforcement agents who have the authority to arrest, detain and prosecute suspects. This has the implication that combing police and intelligence operations will enhance effectiveness and acceptability of service (Chalk 2004, p.43). Such will resolve the problem of conspiracy involved in evidence collection thus making the prosecution process more reliable through enhanced admissibility of evidence in the criminal justice system (Chalk 2004, p.44). Still, combing policing and intelligence improves information dissemination (Chalk 2004, p.44). The sole aim of law enforcement is to ensure effective counterattacks measures even to the least internal security threats. Thus, by unifying the operations of police and intelligence, exchange of information between the two entities will be enhanced for the good of improving responsiveness to security theories (Chalk 2004, p. 46). Also, such eliminates conflict of interest between the two forces thereby promoting accountability on the war against homeland security threats.

Nevertheless, combining policing and intelligence can negatively impact on the process of identifying and destroying terrorist operation cells. A separate intelligence agency devotes its resources in collecting terrorism information through longtime surveillance of suspect activities as opposed to the case- specific approach used by the police (Chalk 2004, p. 48). Still, an independent intelligence unit is more likely to engage local communities for enhancing their information gathering process. This can enhance the participation of the public as they will get informed and appreciate the nature, rationale and purpose of intelligence. Another disadvantage of combining policing and intelligence is that it can compromise the effective approach for identifying and countering terrorism (Chalk 2004, p. 46). Intelligence engages in human-sourced data gathering activities as such help them in enhancing their capabilities and abilities in learning the dynamics involved in the identifying and destroying terrorism operation bases and logistic cells (Chalk 2004, p.46).

Q2. Any actionable intelligence requires adequate knowledge of the target, timing, and the type of attack being planned (Derksen 2005, p. 225). It has been established that almost in all incidences of terrorist attack intelligence at least one of the three elements of intelligence is missing. This is first because an effective counterterrorism process must be prompted by an eminent knowledge of danger (Derksen 2005, p. 225). Just like in any other institution, intelligence practices as a method of finding a lasting solution to insecurity can only be triggered by the evidence of a potential or real problem. It is due to this reason that law enforcements engage in contacting many surveillance activities in the process of trying to identify and qualify terrorism threats. This is quite crucial in the process of identifying the actual target of a terrorist attack as it serves to promote accuracy in the process of planning an effective strategic counterterrorism measures (Derksen 2005, p. 256).

A major problem facing actionable intelligence is qualifying the time of a terrorist attack (Derksen 2005, p. 258). True to the letter, timing of terrorist activities if well known serves to ensure an effective crime prevention plan. It remains illogical for anyone to claim of failed effectiveness by the law enforcement simply because without accurate timing, fluctuation in law enforcement efforts is normal overtime. Clear knowledge of the type of terrorist attack is equally important (Derksen 2005, p. 258). This is because it serves to ensure reliability on the selection of the correct counterattack plans to be used (Derksen 2005, p. 259).  Different types of attacks dictate for different preventive approaches. Therefore, it can be concluded that, without adequate information of the three elements, intelligence remains un-actionable (Derksen 2005, p. 258).  Security beep-ups must require accurate timing while knowledge of specific target and type of attack serves to mitigate undirected approaches in the process of preventing or responding to terrorist threats.