The Challenges of Global Regulation of Arms Smuggling

Arms Smuggling is an underrated and poorly understood form of transnational crime primarily due to the lack of clear statistical data on the issue. Data which is currently available only gives a glimpse into the magnitude of the problem. Western governments have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo in which they participate in international regulatory measures to control arms smuggling whilst continuing to supply arms to the developing world through legal loopholes and covert means. This paper argues that the prospects for the full implementation of United Nations instruments on international arms trade are bleak as long as political, economic and social factors fuel demand for arms around the world.   

Introduction
The international trade in illegal arms is dominated by a demand originating in the relatively lawless global South which is met by a supply from the industrialised North. Demand for weapons is often created by artificial means such as embargoes placed upon warring states which only increase profits on the international black market which are often earned by companies from the same embargo imposing nations. Thus the legal and moral waters are muddy, with Western nations having a large economic incentive to supply arms to developing nations with relatively little chance of any violent threat to their own societies from such trade. For this reason domestic and international legal frameworks have been slow and opaque in dealing with the challenge of arms smuggling. The United States in particular has sought to dilute international regulations to support its domestic arms industry, and maintain domestic jurisprudence which provides for a liberal regime of gun ownership.  The lack of understanding of arms smuggling as a form of Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) is caused in part due to a lack of accurate statistical data. Estimates of arms smuggling are highly unscientific and without any accurate data, addressing the problem in its full scope is highly unlikely. Whilst the end of the cold war and the era of globalisation have changed the dynamic of arms smuggling it has also provided a platform for addressing the issue at the international level. 

Arms Smuggling in North America
The illegal supply of arms within North America demonstrates the dynamics of the trade between developed and developing countries and the challenges of law enforcement at a domestic and international level. The United States is a major exporter of illicit firearms to both Canada and Mexico. In Mexico the supply of illicit firearms from the United States sustains the drug cartels who then export narcotics back to the United States. Gang violence in Canada is linked both to the Mexican narcotics trade and illicit firearms supply from the United States. Statistics are often inaccurate, based as they are on police data of recovery of weapons from crime scenes and border checkpoints which are a tiny fraction of the overall illegal supply. As such the true extent of the problem cannot be comprehended without accurate data.

The United States ensures the right to bear arms in the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Regulations on firearms vary between states and a large secondary market of sales between gun holders makes effective control and regulation difficult both domestically and for the United States neighbours. Canada has much lower levels of gun ownership and stricter controls with citizens having to demonstrate a just cause for gun ownership rather than invoking an inalienable right to bear arms. Mexico has a limited firearms production capacity and a highly restricted regulatory regime for gun ownership which creates a flourishing black market in arms. In this scenario the United States which is a major producer of firearms with relatively liberal firearms laws and large porous borders, provides the supply to meet the demand in both Canada and Mexico.

Data from the United States suggests that in the states which require registration and licensing of guns, guns used in crimes tend to come from out of state, from states which have weaker regulations. Arms can be purchased in unlimited quantities after passing basic criminal checks, whilst diversion of supplies from manufacturers and other forms of illicit transfer exist. Lack of compliance in record keeping at various points in the supply chain combined with the lack of a centralised registration authority reduce the chances of tracing illicit firearms to their original source.

The supply of illegal arms from the United States has deleterious effects on both Canada and the Mexico. The majority of crime guns in Canada are traced back to the United States according to Toronto Police statistics. Only 3 percent of traffic crossing the US Canada border is checked whilst the means for smuggling vary from concealment to the involvement of corrupt officials. The illegal supply of firearms from the United States correlates to a higher degree of violent crime and homicide in Canada. It has been estimated that 90 percent of crime guns in Mexico can be traced back to the United States, with the traffic occurring usually through concealment of small consignments through the land border between the two countries. The illegal supply of firearms has a more pernicious effect on Mexico- adversely effecting life expectancy, GDP, the authority of the state and political stability. The United States experiences blowback from the internecine armed conflict between drug cartels and between the cartels and the Mexican state.

Globalisation and International Arms Smuggling
The effects of globalisation on arms trafficking are a matter of debate. One school of thought attributes the opening of the worlds borders through globalisation as enabling the illicit flow of arms to serve localised conflict zones created by the inequitable and destabilising effects of economic globalisation. The pro globalisation school posits that commercial interests are incentivised to maintain stability and hence will lobby governments and create NGO frameworks to create better transnational regulation of the small arms trade.  Developed nations generally have stronger regulatory capacities and can better manage legal trade in small arms, however the larger issue is how developing countries with weak institutional capacities can combat the illegal import of small arms from developed markets.

The smuggling of arms both out of and within the states of the former Yugoslavia presents an interesting example of the challenges facing weak post conflict states as well as the threat such states pose to other more prosperous nations.  Smuggling of arms in the Balkans revolves around three modes purely profit oriented supply to organised crime syndicates throughout Europe, arming criminals and terrorist organisations, and large scale state sponsored arms trafficking. The case of the Balkans in which the use and proliferation of firearms are culturally ingrained in the midst of unstable political systems demonstrates the limits of a purely legal approach to the issue. Deterrence and punishment must be complimented with political and social approaches to the problem including the building of trust between the state and the citizenry. Globalisation has emboldened organised crime syndicates to export arms to Western Europe whilst weak states which cannot enforce the rule of law are ineffective in the face of large sums of money which can easily bribe low paid government official within governments and at borders. 

Whilst globalisation has created a situation of political instability, weakening state structures and improved transportation and financial means for arms smuggling it has also enabled global legal responses to the issue. Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (PoA) provides the foundation for the international legal framework to prevent arms smuggling. The instrument places the onus on states to create regulatory and enforcement frameworks to prevent the illicit trade in small arms. Effective compliance of states with the aims and content of the PoA vary. One major indicator is regulation of civilian gun ownership. Due to pressure from the United States this was omitted from the PoA however a majority of states do regulate civilian gun ownership autonomously. This stems from the recognition of the relationship between violent crime and civilian gun ownership. Regulation of arms brokers is a further determinant of control of arms smuggling. The PoA mandates the establishment of a system of registration for arms brokers which is particularly important in post conflict zones. The destruction of surplus weapons is another determinant of control of the arms trade. The theft, diversion and sale of surplus weapons, most recently in Iraq, provide a major source of supply for the illicit arms trade. The PoA mandates that states both in peacetime and in post conflict situations ensure the destruction of weapons and prevent the leakage of weapons from armed forces.

Persistence of Demand for Arms
Whilst international regulatory regimes seek to stem the supply of illegal arms, as long as a demand for such arms exist smuggling will always provide a lucrative business for organised crime and corrupt government officials. The demand for illicit arms comes from embargoed governments, groups involved in war, terrorism and crime, and individuals who require guns for cultural or self defence reasons. The supply is procured from government stocks, legal producers, and individual gun holders, post conflict zones and illegal manufacturers. Trafficking is conducted by individuals, organised middlemen and syndicates, and by governments themselves. For example arms smuggling happens in Papua New Guinea through the western border with Indonesia facilitating arms flow from South East Asia for use in tribal disputes and criminal activity. The ownership of production is usually concentrated in the developed nations particularly the United States, Britain and France whilst the demand comes from the politically unstable South.

The nature of illegality in arms trading
The degrees and forms of illegality vary according to the source and destination of the smuggled arms. Illegality may be of both the quality and quantity of arms produced and distributed, as well as in financial transactions which conceal the identities of the trading parties and the nexus of officials involved in both the manufacture and procurement and regulation of arms. Two main ways of avoiding international regulation of the arms trade involve concealing the end user of the exported arms and falsifying the purpose of use. Organised crime syndicates help transport illicit arms across borders and often act as a link between manufacturers, distributors and politicians. The grey market is neither completely illegal nor legal. This grey market is dominated by governments such as Britain and France which seek to work through moral and legal loopholes to supply arms to developing countries to support their own arms industries and associated domestic employment. Developed economies often link aid to developing countries to a reciprocal agreement to purchase arms. Therefore there is a very real economic disincentive for developed nations to fully enforce and support international regulatory frameworks for the smuggling of arms.

The relationship between the legal and illegal arms trade
A major obstacle to better deterrence of arms smuggling is the lack of information within the legal arms trade. One major initiative which could curb illicit trade in weapons could come from greater transparency among governments of legal small arms exports.  States produce small arms however standard sources of information on the international arms trade do not provide statistics on the small arms trade. Curbing the legal supply of arms to repressive states would also assist in stemming the illicit proliferation of weapons. The United States has supplied weapons to a variety of repressive regimes such as Indonesia and Turkey which have used these weapons against their own people. Such regimes usually have less stringent regulatory regimes and higher incidence of corruption which assist in arms smuggling. Banning the supply of small arms to non state actors would reduce illegal exchange in the black markets. The classic case of proliferation after the transfer from a state to non state actor is that of the United States arming of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets during the 1980s. After the conflict ended the arms spread much beyond the control of the Americans and led to the permanent destabilisation of the region. The United States supply to the Afghans happened in a covert way through the Pakistani Army and Pakistans intelligence agencies which led to a complete loss of control over the distribution and management of the weapon pool. 

The Post Cold War Scenario
The post cold war era has seen a change in motivations and dynamics of arms smuggling. The illicit arms trade is less ideologically motivated in the post cold war era, being mainly motivated by profit. In a post cold war world the nature of warfare has changed becoming less inter-state and more intra state oriented. Arms embargoes often used by Western powers to punish rogue states ironically sustain the illicit trade in arms, obstructing states and non state actors from purchasing arms legally. Manufacturers in developed nations often license the manufacture of their weapons in developing countries to avoid stringent export controls as in the case of the British firm Heckler and Koche which licenses its production in nations such as Pakistan and Iran. This in essence serves the interests of all involved, the British firm, the British government, the local manufacturers and the buyers.  In a situation where demand exists, cutting off legal supply only enlarges profits for smugglers. Whilst governments in developing countries often turn a blind eye to the flow of illegal small arms as the opportunity cost of allocating intelligence and infrastructure resources to such an issue is high whilst the resultant violence generally does not reach a point of threatening economic growth or the existence of the state.

Implementation of United Nations instruments
The South Pacific Islands provide an interesting example of the challenges of implementing international firearms regulations, and the threats which non compliance can pose. The United Nations Small Arms Conference of 2001 Program of Action fell short of expectations in many respects such as the lack of a legally binding international instrument on tracing and marking of weapons, arms brokering, curbing transfers of small arms to non state units as well as regulation of civilian possession of firearms. The Program of Action has however acted as an impetus to some states particularly in the South Pacific in improving the management procedures of armouries within national armed forces. In addition states are obliged to destroy post conflict weapons, surplus stocks of weapons and weapons which are seized. The principle of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or DRR is used as a framework for eradicating illegal weapons from civilian spaces. Intelligence sharing amongst states has also been facilitated along with awareness building of illegal arms related issues among the general public.

However the case of the Pacific Islands highlights the need for North-South cooperation, as developing nations require financial assistance from the developed nations of the region such as Japan, New Zealand and Australia to create better capabilities for compliance with the UN regime. The small Pacific islands are in fact most sensitive to the illegal trade in arms as even a relatively small number of arms can debilitate their societies due to the weakness of their law enforcement structures combined with small land mass and low populations.  In this instance the Pacific islands may have more interest in effective implementation of the United Nations regime than developed nations in assisting them to do so.

An outline for future action
A framework for future action to reduce arms smuggling can be offered on the basis of the experiences and situations already outlined. There is a need for greater research into the issue of illegal smuggling of small arms particularly in tracking supply lines between the relatively lawless regions and nations in which the rule of law is stronger. Greater co-ordination between states will be a herculean task given the proliferation of state and supra national law enforcement bodies.  A global information exchange would enhance both knowledge and co-operation between states and international law enforcement agencies.  Furthermore legislative reform is required to bring national law into compliance with international obligations and to better rationalise domestic responses to the illegal trade in arms. Increased training and allocation of resources for restructuring of law enforcement bodies is needed to keep pace with the new challenges of financial flows and supply chains which are evolving at a rapid pace. Whilst greater transparency and accountability within governments would reduce the levels of corruption which ease the supply chain and prevent effective law enforcement in the global illegal arms trade. Furthermore rather than pursuing a state centric approach, private entities such as arms brokers and arms manufacturers need to be involved in developing more transparent legal frameworks.

Conclusion
The persistence of conflict in the global south, particularly sub Saharan Africa, and the extent of the drug menace in the Western world mean that demand for illegal arms is unlikely to disappear in the near future. Likewise Western nations which have a base of production of arms have little incentive to stop the flow of weapons to distant countries and only feel impelled to act when gun related violence threatens their own societies. United Nations international instruments can provide a framework within which to act however cannot address the political and social circumstances which create the demand for weapons. In this case the impact of such international regulatory frameworks will be limited at best.   International arms smuggling will continue to be a poorly understood aspect of Transnational Organised Crime due the lack of accurate data which is linked to the incentive which all major actors, both state and non state actors, have in concealing the true extent of the trade and preserving the status quo.

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